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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This matter comes before the Court on a certification of questions of law by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This Court issued an Order of Acceptance 
on October 31, 2007 accepting the questions certified to it. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(1). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act confer to state officers an 
immunity from suit (immediately appealable) or merely an immunity from liability (not 
immediately appealable)? 
When a federal court certifies questions of state law, the Utah Supreme Court 
answers the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying dispute. In re Kunz, 
2004 UT 71, If 1, 8, 99 P.3d 793. 
2. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act require that a Notice of Claim 
against state officials in their individual capacity expressly aver "fraud" or "malice"? 
When a federal court certifies questions of state law, the Utah Supreme Court 
answers the legal questions presented without resolving the underlying dispute. In re Kunz, 
2004 UT 71, H 1, 8, 99 P.3d 793. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition 
of this appeal: 
Utah Code § 63-30-3 (2000) (see Addendum 1). 
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Utah Code § 63-30-4 (2000) (see Addendum 2). 
Utah Code § 63-30-11 (2000) (see Addendum 3). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of alleged violations of Appellee's civil rights and 
intentional torts against her during a traffic stop in February of 2003. In January 2004, Ms. 
Mecham filed a Notice of Claim, as required by Utah law, with the appropriate state officials 
for various intentional torts including battery, abuse of process, assault, malicious 
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Mecham eventually filed 
a complaint in federal court alleging the common law causes of action and violations of her 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
Citing Rule 12(b)(6), defendants moved for dismissal of the common law tort 
claims pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA). See U.C.A. § 63-30-1 et 
seq. The district court disregarded the defendants' argument that the Notice of Claim was 
defective and allowed Ms. Mecham to amend her complaint. Defendants then moved under 
Rule 12(b)(1) for dismissal for alleged defect in the Notice of Claim under Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-30-4(4) (2000). On October 7, 2004, the district court denied this motion. 
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on November 2, 2004. In an opinion dated 
September 11, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified two 
questions of state law to this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 23,2003, Ms. Mecham, the Plaintiff/Appellee, was pulled 
over by Defendant/Appellant Frazier for driving five miles per hour over the speed limit and 
for failing to wear her seatbelt. Aplt. App. at 11 -12. 
2. During the traffic stop, Appellant Frazier was informed by dispatch that 
Ms. Mecham's Arizona driver's license was suspended. Id. Since she had only recently been 
pulled over and been informed that her license was valid, she became fearful that the officer 
was using a ruse to get her out of her car. Id. Appellant Frazier continued to demand that 
Ms. Mecham get out of her car and became angry when she refused to comply. Id. 
3. After he called a tow truck, Defendant Frazier demanded that Ms. 
Mecham get out of her car and when she refused he immediately sprayed her in the face with 
pepper spray. Id. at 12 -13. He then violently dragged her out of the car, threw her to the 
ground, wrenched her arms behind her back, and handcuffed her. Id. 
4. Ms. Mecham timely filed a Notice of Claim with the Utah Attorney 
General and other officials as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 33 -
36. The Appellants do not dispute that the Notice of Claim was timely filed and filed with 
the correct officials. Id. at 92. 
5. After filing her initial Complaint, the Defendants moved to dismiss 
pursuant to 12(b)(6), the Court granted the Motion but gave Ms. Mecham an opportunity to 
amend her complaint. Aplt. App. at 2. Ms. Mecham filed her Amended Complaint on July 
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20, 2004. Aplt. App. at 3. Defendants then moved the district court to dismiss again 
pursuant to 12(b)(1). Id, The motion was denied at hearing on September 16,2004. Id, The 
Appellants filed a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit which certified two questions of state law to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
In Point I, the Appellee contends that the Utah Legislature has waived 
immunity from suit for government employees where a claim is brought against them in their 
individual capacities pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-4. That 
section states that a civil action against the individual employee is the exclusive remedy for 
injuries where it is "established" that the state employee acted or failed to act due to "fraud" 
or "malice." By making civil suit the exclusive remedy and requiring a claimant to 
"establish" that the state employee's action was due to fraud or malice, the legislature waived 
immunity from suit that was generally granted to state employees in § 63-30-3 (2000). In 
response to the first question certified to it, the Court should answer that the Utah legislature 
has waived immunity from suit for state employees sued in their individual capacities. 
POINT II 
In Point II, the Appellee contends that the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
has never required a claimant to specifically plead "malice" or "fraud" in her notice of claim. 
Using accepted standards of statutory construction, the Court should find that plain language 
of Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11 (2000) does not require specific pleading of "malice" 
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where the claim is against an individual employee. Utah courts have repeatedly ruled that 
strict compliance with § 63-30-11 is all that is required for claimants in filing their notice of 
claim. The strict compliance standard is a two-way street in that the claimant does not have 
to provide information or perform beyond the plain meaning of § 63-30-11. In response to 
the second question certified to it, the Court should answer that the Governmental Immunity 
Act did not require a claimant to expressly aver "fraud" or "malice" in a notice of claim. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD RULE THAT THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 
WAIVED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT FOR EMPLOYEES SUED IN 
THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 63-30-4 (2000). 
Relying on established rules of statutory construction the Court must find that 
the Utah legislature has waived immunity from suit for state officials sued in their individual 
capacities pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-4 (2000). Following accepted rules of statutory 
interpretation, the Court must find that the specific requirements of § 63-30-4 (3) and (4) 
waive the general immunity from suit granted to the State in § 63-30-3. 
A. When Considering Two Conflicting Statutory Provisions, the Specific 
Provision Governs Over the General Provision. When interpreting statutory provisions, 
a court must determine legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is the 
plain language of the statute. Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 
18, f 30, 974 P.2d 1194,1203. The courts presume that the legislature used each particular 
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word advisedly, and give effect to each word according to its commonly accepted meaning. 
Versluis v. Guar. Nafl Cos., 842 P.2d 865,867 (Utah 1992). It is a general tenet of statutory 
construction that "[W]hen two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision 
more specific in operation governs over the more general provision." Thomas v. Color 
Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, f 9, 84 P.3d 1201. 
B. The Legislature Waived The General Immunity From Suit By Making 
Civil Suit Against Individual Employees The Exclusive Remedy In § 63-30-4(3). The 
Utah legislature has granted the State and its employees a general immunity from suit in Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-30-3 (2000). However, the legislature expressly acknowledged that the 
general grant of immunity from suit is waived under certain circumstances. In Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-30-4(1 )(b), it states: 
If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter; consent to be sued is 
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were 
a private person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(1 )(b) (2000) (emphasis added). By making civil suit the 
exclusive remedy, the Legislature waived immunity from suit for employees in their 
individual capacities in § 63-30-4(3): 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action under this chapter 
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or 
omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive 
remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding 
based upon the same subject matter against an employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
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(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) (2000). The exception to the general rule that employees 
may not be sued as individuals is where the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. This interpretation makes sense, because where the employee acts due to either of 
these motivations, he or she no longer acts within the scope of their employment with the 
State and the State would no longer be liable for their actions. Waiving the immunity for suit 
for employees in these circumstances also denies sovereign immunity from those state 
employees who would use the power of the State to injure or defraud its citizens. The Court 
should interpret § 63-30-4(3) as a waiver of the general immunity from suit for employees 
who act due to fraud or malice. 
C. In § 63-30-4(4), The Legislature Waived Immunity From Suit By 
Requiring A Claimant To "Establish" That The Individual Employee Acted Through 
"Fraud" or "Malice." Even though the Legislature made a general grant of immunity from 
suit in § 63-30-3, the provisions of § 63-30-4(4) constitute a specific waiver of that immunity 
by requiring that allegations of fraud or malice be "established" or rendered to a verdict. 
Section 63-30-4(4) reads: 
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which 
the government entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that: 
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice; 
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U.C.A. § 63-30-4(4) (2000) (emphasis added). As noted above, the grant of immunity from 
suit in § 63-30-3 is a broad, general provision applicable to the "all governmental entities." 
U.C.A. § 63-3-3(1). In the following section, however, the Legislature expressly states that 
the chapter may provide waivers or exceptions to the general immunity from suit. U.C.A. 
§ 63-3-4-(l)(b) ("If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is 
granted, . . . . Id.). The Legislature continues in § 63-30-4, setting out a waiver of the 
general immunity from suit by requiring that fraud or malice be "established" for claims 
against individual employees. Of course, it is impossible for a claimant to "establish" that 
the employee "acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice," without bringing suit and 
obtaining some sort of finding by a court to that effect. U.C.A. § 63-30-4(4). By using the 
word "established," the legislature signaled its intent to allow suits against individual 
employees to proceed. If a verdict or capitulation resulted on the issue of fraud or malice, 
then the employee became individually liable. 
D. Finding That § 63-30-4 Governs Over § 63-30-3 Harmonizes The Two 
Provisions And Gives Each Of Them Effect. Even though the Governmental Immunity 
Act generally grants immunity from suit in § 63-30-3, if the Court were to apply that rule to 
§ 63-30-4(4), the general rule would eviscerate the specific waiver of immunity for 
individual employees. To harmonize the to provisions and give each effect, the Court must 
find that § 63-30-4(3) and (4) constitute a specific waiver of the general immunity from suit 
found in § 63-30-3. This rule preserves the general immunity granted to the State and gives 
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effect to the specific waiver where an employee acts with fraud or malice. Thus both 
provisions are rendered meaningful and effective and upholds the legislature's intent to allow 
individual employees to be sued where they act with fraud or malice. 
POINT II 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT DID NOT REQUIRE EXPRESS PLEADING OF THE 
WORDS "MALICE" OR "FRAUD" IN THE NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
A. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Has Never Required That a 
Claimant Specifically State "Malice" or "Fraud" in the Notice of 
Claim. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, encoded at Utah Code Annotated § 
63-30-11, has never required a claimant to expressly plead "malice" or "fraud" in her notice 
of claim. When interpreting statutory provisions, a court must determine legislative intent, 
and the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Craftsman 
Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, \ 30, 974 P.2d 1194, 1203. The 
courts presume that the legislature used each particular word advisedly, and give effect to 
each word according to its commonly accepted meaning. Versluis v. Guar. Natl Cos., 842 
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). In determining whether a notice of claim required by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act meets the statutory requirements, the courts must view the 
notice in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427,432 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) (when considering defendants' motion to dismiss all facts are viewed in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff and defendants' actions may be "construed to rise to the level 
of malice." Id.) 
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Section 63-30-11 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the Act) contained 
all of the requirements for the Notice of Claim.1 The Act required that the notice set forth 
the following: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
U.C.A. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a) (2000). Noticeably, the plain language of 63-30-11 did not require 
that the notice of claim delineate between negligence and intentional torts. It did not require 
different elements when the claims are being made against individual employees and the 
State of Utah. The plain language of the statute did not require the use of "malice" or 
"fraud" when the claimant is suing an individual employee. It is little surprise then that 
section 63-30-11 has been strictly construed by the Utah courts which have declined to heap 
on additional requirements beyond what the Legislature required. 
B. "Malice" Need Not Be Expressly Pleaded in a Notice of Claim - Baker 
v. Angus. In Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals 
ruled that a claimant's allegations were sufficient under the Act where the facts alleged, if 
proven, would establish that the individual employees acted with malice. In Baker, the 
plaintiffs, Bill and Patricia Baker had placed their troubled teenage daughter Amy Baker in 
the custody of the Utah Division of Family Services (DFS). Id. at 429. While in custody, 
1
 Section 63-30-11 has been amended several times since Ms. Mecham was required 
to file her notice in February, 2004. A copy of the provision is included as Addendum 3. 
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Amy had a tumultuous experience which culminated in her being admitted to a local hospital 
and her parents being informed that she had been raped. Id. The Bakers sued under § 1983 
and state law claims for "intentional, malicious, deliberately indifferent and/or grossly 
negligent deprivation of Amy Baker's substantive rights to reasonable and adequate 
conditions of confinement, care and treatment." Id. The defendants made a Motion to 
Dismiss, which was granted by the trial court. The trial court concluded that the claims were 
barred by the notice requirements of the Act. Id. 
On appeal, the Bakers contended that they had "sufficiently pleaded that the 
state defendants in their individual capacities as opposed to their official capacities, acted 
maliciously so as to exempt application of the Government Immunity Act." Id. at 432. The 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the allegations "when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the Bakers, allege[d] several instances in which the state defendant's] . . . 
actions could be construed to rise to the level of malice." Id. The Court of Appeals found 
that the Bakers satisfied the Notice requirement by alleging that the individual employee 
threatened to terminate state care for Amy if the parents investigated, that the employee did 
not report a suicide attempt by Amy and seemed hostile, and that the employee told others 
that Amy was lying about being raped. Id. 
Like the notice of claim in Baker v. Angus\ Ms. Mecham' s Notice alleges facts 
such that, if proven, would establish that the Appellants acted with malice in spraying her in 
the eyes with pepper spray, assaulting her, and maliciously prosecuting her. Ms. Mecham's 
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Notice describes how she was pulled over and found to have a suspended driver's license. 
Aplt. App. 34. It further alleges that Ms. Mecham feared for her safety after the Trooper told 
her that her license was suspended and that he was going to have her car towed and 
impounded. Id. It describes how Ms. Mecham's mother called her during her conversation 
with Trooper Frazier to check on her. Trooper Frazier ordered her to put the phone down and 
when she did not comply he walked back to his car. Id. The Notice details how Trooper 
Frazier returned to her car sometime later and demanded that she get out so that it could be 
towed. Aplt. App. at 35. Ms. Mecham was still afraid and asked Trooper Frazier to speak 
with her mother on the phone to explain what was going on. Trooper Frazier refused and 
sprayed her in the eyes and face with pepper spray. He then violently dragged her out of the 
car, and threw her to the pavement. The Notice alleges as follows: 
Troopers Frazier and Johnson unreasonably arrested Ms. Mecham which 
constituted an unreasonable seizure of her person in violation of the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also committed the civil 
torts of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Ms. Mecham alleges 
that the troopers' actions were unreasonable and were calculated to physically 
injure, intimidate, and terrorize her. 
Aplt. App. 35. Conduct "calculated to physically injure intimidate, and terrorize "is clearly 
due to malice. Such conduct is unquestionably "a wrongful act intentionally done without 
cause or excuse." 
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There can be no doubt that if Ms. Mecham can prove the facts as alleged in the 
Notice, that she can establish that the Troopers acted with malice toward her. That is all the 
Act required. 
C. The Utah Court of Appeals Has Declined To Impose Additional 
Requirements Beyond The Plain Language of § 63-30-1L The Utah Court of Appeals 
has strictly construed § 63-30-11 in determining when the form and contents of a Notice of 
Claim meet the statutory requirements. Even though the strict compliance standard often 
favors the State or its employees, it is not a one-way street. "A claimant is not required to 
do more than the Act plainly requires." Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, f9. A notice is 
sufficient so long as it complies with the plain language of the Act. Id. 
In Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, 100 P.3d 254, 257, the Utah Court 
of Appeals held that strict compliance with the Act did not require a claimant's notice of 
claim to contain more than the plain elements in § 63-30-11. Id. at ff 9-10. In Peeples, the 
plaintiff sued for injuries she suffered after falling on an icy sidewalk outside a state owned 
liquor store. Id. at f 2. She timely filed a notice of claim with the Utah Attorney General but 
failed to identify the liquor store in question, either by address or in any other manner. Id. 
at f 4. After Ms. Peeples brought suit, the State moved to dismiss under 12(b)(6) contending 
that Ms. Peeples' notice did not contain a sufficient "brief statement of the facts" as required 
by § 63-30-11. Id. at f 5. The trial court dismissed the claim because the notice of claim 
failed to list the address of the liquor store and thus failed to comply with the § 63-30-11. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals reversed, holding that one sentence from the notice was sufficient 
as a "brief statement of the facts" - "On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a 
Utah State Liquor Store on ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a 
poorly designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather that underneath 
it." Id. at f 10. The court found that this statement strictly complied with the requirements 
of the Act. The also noted that the notice of claim requirement does not bar a claim simply 
because the state would like more information than the Act requires. Regarding alleged 
defects or omissions in the Notice of Claim, the court stated: 
As such, factual notice under the Act need not "meet the 
standards required to state a claim for relief," and factual defects 
in the notice will not bar a claim so long as the claim gives 
"general notice of an intent to sue." 
Id. at <J 11 quoting Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983). 
Hence, a notice of claim which strictly complies with the requirements of § 63-30-1 land 
which provides "a general notice of an intent to sue" is sufficient to satisfy the Act. 
Likewise, in Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), the Utah Court of 
Appeals also considered the sufficiency of a Notice of Claim and ruled that the notice 
satisfied the act where it advised the State of the key facts, the nature of the claims, and the 
identity of the parties. 
In her Notice of Claim, Ms. Mecham complied with all of the requirements 
of § 63-30-11 including a brief statement of the facts, the nature of the claims asserted, and 
a description of the damages she suffered. Aplt. App. at 33 - 36. In fact, considering the 
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ruling in Peeples, the Notice exceeds the requirements of § 63-30-11 by describing the exact 
location, date and time of the incident, and by listing the citation and criminal case number. 
Aplt. App. at 33. The Notice gives a thorough factual account of the incident comprising at 
least one page of single-spaced typewritten text describing the conduct of the troopers and 
the surrounding circumstances. Aplt. App. at 34-35. The Notice also gives a detailed list of 
claims being asserted which reads as follows: 
This claim is for the torts of assault, battery, intentional affliction of 
emotional distress, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious 
prosecution against Trooper Sean D. Frazier and Trooper David L. 
Johnson. 
Aplt. App. 33. Under the heading "Specific Allegations of Misconduct and Negligence," all 
of the above intentional torts are again listed with the allegation that, "Ms. Mecham alleges 
that the troopers' actions were unreasonable and were calculated to physically injure, 
intimidate, and terrorize her."2 Aplt. App. at 35. Finally, the Notice sets forth a description 
of Ms. Mecham's injuries so far as they were known at the time. Aplt. App. at 35 - 36. Ms. 
Mecham's Notice of Claim met or exceeded the requirements of §63-30-11 in every respect. 
Without question, it gave "general notice of an intent to sue," as required by the rule in 
Peeples. Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, 111. 
D. Straley v. Halliday Is Readily Distinguishable. Before the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Appellants' sole contention was that the rule in Straley v. Halliday, 
2While the Notice also alleges negligence on the part of the troopers, Ms. Mecham 
determined that she would not pursue those claims when she filed her Complaint. 
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2000 UT App 38, 997 P.2d 338 requires claimants to provide information beyond the plain 
language of § 63-30-11, when bringing claims against individual employees. Not only is this 
a tortured reading of the holding in that case, but, the facts in that case are readily 
distinguishable from the facts here. The plaintiff in Straley, acting pro se, filed two notices 
of claim: the first failed to allege acts which constituted malice,3 the second notice alleged 
malice but was untimely and was not filed with the Attorney General as required by the Act. 
Straley, 997 P.2d at 342, note 3 at 340. The trial court dismissed Straley's Amended 
Complaint, finding that he had failed to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed ruling that, the variance between the notice of claim and 
the Amended Complaint was more than a simple expansion of what was alleged in the notice 
and affirmed the dismissal. Id. 
In the present case, unlike the plaintiff in Straley, Ms. Mecham has not 
conceded that her timely filed notice is defective in any manner. By the same token, the 
Appellants have not contended that the notice was substantially different from the allegations 
in the complaint except that the word "malice" is not expressly used. The allegations in Ms. 
Mecham's Notice of malicious conduct, calculated to injure, intimidate, and terrorize are 
consistent with the allegations brought forth in the Amended Complaint. Aplt. App. 33-36; 
3The insufficiency of the notice in Straley was acknowledged by the claimant and, in 
fact, was the impetus for sending the second notice. Straley v. Halliday, 997 P.2d at 340 - 41. 
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10-18. If proven, the allegations in her Notice of Claim and in the Amended Complaint 
would establish that the troopers acted with malice. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the Court should answer the first certified question that the 
Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity from suit for individual employees pursuant 
to § 63-30-4. With regard to the second question, this Court should answer in the negative 
- that the Governmental Immunity Act, encoded in § 63-30-11, does not require a claimant 
to expressly aver "fraud" or "malice" in her notice of claim. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 2008 
ory B Mattson, 
Attorney for Appellee 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Code § 63-30-3 (2000) (see Addendum 1). 
Utah Code § 63-30-4 (2000) (see Addendum 2). 
Utah Code § 63-30-11 (2000) (see Addendum 3). 
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63-30-3. I m m u n i t y of governmental entit ies from sui t . 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other gov-
ernmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following 
state medical programs and services performed at a 
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to 
the core of governmental activity in this state and are 
considered to be governmental functions: 
(I) care of a patient referred by another hospital or 
physician because of the high risk nature of the 
patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah 
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided 
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropri-
ate medical care or treatment at another medical 
facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a 
state-owned university hospital or by physicians em-
ployed at a state-owned university acting in the scope 
of their employment that a court finds is unique or 
essential to the core of governmental activity in this 
state, 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the 
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may 
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and 
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to 
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center 
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their 
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 
62A, Chapter 4a. 1991 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or 
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immu-
nity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of em-
ployee — Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifi-
cally provided, may be construed as an admission or 
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental 
entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by 
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any 
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict 
liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely 
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity 
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action 
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its 
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that 
occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of author-
ity is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil 
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter 
against the employee or the estate of the employee wh 
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act throi 
fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the con 
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3 )(c). 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action againsl 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act 
omission complained of is one for which the governmen 
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held persona 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performai 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
under color of authority, unless it is established that t 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. l 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity a s to contractual oblig 
tions. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out 
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to t 
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-S 
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Wat 
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from 
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapt 
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver ti 
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other na tu i 
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in tl 
amount of available water. 19 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to act ions involvi i 
property. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waiv< 
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for tl 
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to forecloi 
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any adven 
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any moi 
gage or other lien said entity may have or claim on tl 
property involved. 1» 
63-30-7. Repealed. la 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused b y d< 
fective, unsafe, or dangerous condit ion < 
highways, bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptior 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit ( 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, roa< 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridg< 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 19S 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerou 
or defective public building, structure, o 
other public improvement — Exception. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exception 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit c 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused fron 
a dangerous or defective condition of any public building 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 199 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused h] 
negligent act or omission of employee — Ex 
ceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waivec 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission o 
an employee committed within the scope of employmen 
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or result* 
from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exer 
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or noi 
the discretion is abused; 
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63-30-3. Immuni ty of governmenta l ent i t ies from suit . 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other gov-
ernmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following 
state medical programs and services performed at a 
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to 
the core of governmental activity in this state and are 
considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or 
physician because of the high risk nature of the 
patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah 
only at a state-owned university hospital or provided 
in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropri-
ate medical care or treatment at another medical 
facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a 
state-owned university hospital or by physicians em-
ployed at a state-owned university acting in the scope 
of their employment that a court finds is unique or 
essential to the core of governmental activity in this 
state, 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the 
limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may 
submit the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and 
the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to 
be governmental functions, and governmental entities and 
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center 
are immune from suit for any injury which results from their 
joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 
* 62A, Chapter 4a. 1991 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or 
denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immu-
nity — Exclusive remedy — Joinder of em-
ployee — Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifi-
cally provided, may be construed as an admission or 
denial of liability or responsibility by or for governmental 
entities or their employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, 
consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by 
any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any 
provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict 
liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely 
affecting any immunity from suit that a governmental entity 
or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), an action 
under this chapter against a governmental entity or its 
employee for an injury caused by an act or omission that 
occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of author-
ity is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil 
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter 
against the employee or the estate of the employee \ 
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act thi 
fraud or malice; or 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the c 
tions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c). 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action agair 
governmental entity in a representative capacity if the a 
omission complained of is one for which the governm< 
entity may be liable, but no employee may be held persoi 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the perform 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employ men 
under color of authority, unless it is established that 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obi 
tions. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entitiei 
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising oi 
contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to 
requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63 
14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the Division of Wi 
Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water fror 
reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chaj 
26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to deliver 
contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natt 
condition, or safety condition that causes a deficiency in 
amount of available water. ] 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involvi 
property. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is wah 
for the recovery of any property real or personal or for i 
possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to forecL 
mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any adve 
claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mc 
gage or other lien said entity may have or claim on t 
property involved. l 
63-30-7. Repealed. i« 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by c 
fective, unsafe, or dangerous condition 
highways, bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptio 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused 03 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, ros 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, brid| 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. is 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangeroi 
or defective public building, structure, « 
other public improvement — Exception. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptioi 
to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit 
all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused fro 
a dangerous or defective condition of any public buildin 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement, lfr 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused b 
negligent act or omission of employee — Ei 
ceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waive 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission < 
an employee committed within the scope of employmer 
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or result 
from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exei 
cise or perform a discretionary function, whether or nc 
the discretion is abused; 
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(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of pro-
cess, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract 
rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or 
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without 
probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not 
it is negligent or intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or con-
trolled lands, any condition existing in connection with an 
abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity 
authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State 
Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management 
or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 
41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located 
on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 
5a dr Title 73, Chapter 10 which immunity is in addition 
to all other immunities granted by law. 1996 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private 
property without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Consti-
tution, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmen-
tal entity when the governmental entity has taken or dam-
aged private property for public uses without just compensa-
tion. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according 
to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
1991 
63-30-10.6. Attorneys' fees for records requests. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for recovery of attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 
and 63-2-802. 
Notwithstanding Section 63-30-11: 
(a) a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subs 
tion (1) may be filed contemporaneously with a petit] 
for review under Section 63-2-404; and 
(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter that is related t( 
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be broug 
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or ir 
subsequent action. u 
63-30-11. Cla im for in jury — Notice — C o n t e n t s 
Serv ice — Legal disabil i ty [Effective u n 
July 1, 2001]. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations th 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begii 
to run. >. •» 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a gover 
mental entity, or against its employee for an act or omissk 
occurring during the performance of the employee's dutie 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authorii 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity befoi 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not tr 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as govern 
mental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far a 
they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or tha 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town Recorder, when the claim i, 
against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is agains 
a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis 
trator of the board, when the claim is against i 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board 
when the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian a t the 
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension tha t 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an exten-
sion, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the gov-
ernmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
1998 
Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — 
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of 
guardian ad litem [Effective July 1, 2001]. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations tha t 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins 
to run. 
\6) Any person navmg a ciaim ion injury against a govern-
mental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as govern-
mental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(1) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted, and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent,' attorney, parent, or legal guardian, 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is 
against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against 
a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis-
trator of the board, when the claim is against a 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, 
when the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the 
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an exten-
sion, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the gov-
ernmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
(d) (i) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to 
result in a claim against a governmental entity is 
sustained by a potential claimant described in Sub-
section (4)(a), that government entity may file a 
request with the court for the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this 
Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim under 
Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins when the 
order appointing the guardian is issued. 2000 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time 
for filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of the employ-
ee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under CO\OT of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under 
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
1998 
b^-^u-i«i. i^iaim aga ins t poli t ical subdivis ion o r i t s em-
ployee — Time for filing not ice . 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
t\me granted \mder Section 6S-S0-11, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1998 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or den i a l b y 
g o v e r n m e n t a l ent i ty or i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r 
w i th in n ine ty days . 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day 
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. Denia l of c la im for injury — Autho r i t y a n d 
t ime for filing act ion aga ins t g o v e r n m e n t a l 
ent i ty. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action 
in the district court against the governmental entity or an 
employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial 
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-16. J u r i s d i c t i o n of d i s t r ic t cour t s over actions — 
Appl ica t ion of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over any action brought under this chapter. 
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried 
as a small claims action and shall be governed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent they are consistent with 
this chapter. 1999 
63-30-17. Venue of ac t ions . 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in 
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against 
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose, or m the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a 
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including 
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the 
claim arose. 1983 
63-30-18. Compromise and se t t lement of actions. 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal 
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, 
may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or 
other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative 
Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less 
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative and the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services, compromise and settle 
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the 
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and 
